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Abstract: This paper investigates the changing impact of economic globalization on inflation 
in China over the post-reform era. We construct an inflation dynamics model with 
globalization factors from microeconomic foundations. Empirical results with quarterly data 
spanning from 1984 to 2012 show that in 1994 there was a significant structural change in the 
inflation dynamics model, after which China’s inflation responded more significantly to 
foreign economic slack while the slope of the inflation-domestic slack relation reduced 
substantively. The finding indicates that the prescription that central banks should specifically 
react to developments in global output is justified for China over the post-1994 era. 
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1. Introduction 
China’s integration into the global economy brings a fundamental change to the global 
economic system and provides the nation historical opportunities benefitting from this 
globalization process (Mishkin, 2006). Indeed, China’s economic growth performance over 
the last two decades has been spectacular, with the growth rate of gross domestic product 
(GDP) averaging above 8 percent and an overall economy now ranking second largest in the 
world (based on market exchange rates). As its economy becomes more open and more 
integrated in international trade (and finance), China faces an increasingly complex set of 
policy challenges. Given its important role in the world economy, in terms of population and 
sheer economic size, addressing these challenges effectively has important economic and 
political implications for both China and economies beyond its national borders.  
                                                        
1 School of Finance and China Financial Policy Research Center, Renmin University of China, Beijing, China 
zhangcs@ruc.edu.cn 
2 College of Arts and Sciences, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, USA hh454@cornell.edu 
  2 
One of the leading challenges for China is the changing nature of inflation dynamics 
brought upon by the current great globalization. In particular, the past decade saw a marked 
fall in China’s inflation, which was also associated with a distinct increase in economic 
globalization more generally seen in China than that in the industrial countries. As Figure 1 
attested, the level of economic globalization in China has risen from less than 0.3 in the 
1980s to around 0.4 in the 1990s and above 0.5 in the most recent decade
3
. The rising 
globalization brings a new challenge for the Chinese central bank, the People’s Bank of 
China (PBOC). If the PBOC fails to grasp profound global changes at play and their 
implications for domestic inflation developments, it could cost the nation a dangerous lurch 
into secular deflation or unexpected high inflation.  
 
 
Figure 1 China’s economic globalization (total trade divided by nominal GDP; SA): 1984Q1—2012Q4 
Source: Central Administration of Customs, National Bureau of Statistics of China, and the author’s 
calculations. 
 
Despite conspicuous importance of the effects of globalization on inflation dynamics in 
China, much of the existing studies have focused on the relevant issue for industrial 
economies. One motivation for concentrating on industrial economies is that the increasing 
integration of China and other lower-cost producers into world production networks may 
have induced downward pressure on wages and import prices in industrial countries (BIS, 
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2005). While early studies such as Kamin et al. (2006) have not found much evidence for the 
downward price effect, there now exists a substantial body of research documenting that there 
is a pronounced effect (e.g. Auer and Fischer, 2010; Auer et al, 2010; Holz and Mehrotra, 
2013). This cross-border price spillover effect may also materialize through global value 
chains (see Aurer and Mehrotra, 2014; Hirakata et al., 2014). 
In addition, excess capacity abroad may have helped manufactures in the industrial 
countries meet the domestic demand without straining domestic resources and pushing up 
inflationary pressures. Recent researches of BIS (2005), Helbling et al. (2006), Borio and 
Filardo (2007), Sbordone (2009), Auer et al. (2010), and Milani (2010) appear to support this 
argument. In particular, Borio and Filardo (2007) estimate traditional Phillips curves for 
fifteen industrialized countries and find that foreign output gap drives domestic inflation 
significantly in most of these economies. However, this finding has been challenged by Ball 
(2006), Badinger (2009), and Ihrig et al. (2010), who conduct similar empirical analyses for a 
narrower sample of countries, by Pain et al. (2006) using a system of error correction 
mechanism for a sample of 21 OECD countries, and by Calza (2009) using alternative 
specifications of traditional Phillips curve augmented by the contemporaneous foreign output 
gap for 26 advanced and developing economies.   
These different findings for the industrial economies may be unsurprising because the 
integration of emerging countries into the global economy can bring interconnecting and 
two-way impacts on the inflation process of advanced economies. On the one hand, higher 
demand may drive up prices for energy, raw materials, and general commodities, which 
eventually reflects in overall price inflation. On the other hand, an influx of lower cost labor, 
products and services into the world market can drive prices downward. This two-way impact 
may also explain why globalization-inflation relationship remains a “puzzle” (Temple, 2002) 
when different pools of countries are considered as in Romer (1993), Terra (1998), and 
Gruben and McLeod (2004).  
However, the impact of globalization on China’s inflation process, being that it is the 
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world’s largest developing and emerging economy, may be less ambiguous. Indeed, inflation 
in China is more likely to be affected than that of an industrial economy by foreign demand 
and supply via the international goods market, since China’s economic development has 
higher dependence on global trade than industrial economies. In addition, China is the 
exporter of lower cost labor, products and services, and hence less affected by world factor 
market.  
Therefore, this paper focuses on the link between globalization and inflation dynamics in 
China. While institutional circumstances and economic conditions in China are different from 
the developed economies, which may matter a great deal in formulating a suitable framework 
for inflation dynamics, are there clear general principles in the changing nature of inflation 
dynamics for China that can serve as a guide in the process of the current great globalization? 
In the present paper, we attempt to fill the existing void and provide a complementary 
explanation towards the changing inflation performances in China, linking them to broader 
debates in academic literature as well as policy implications.  
To this end, we will develop an extended New Keynesian Phillips curve from an open 
economy version of an extended Calvo’s (1983) sticky price model with microeconomic 
foundations relating to the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. The commonly 
used framework in the literature of globalization and inflation is the traditional 
backward-looking Phillips curve model (e.g. Borio and Filardo, 2007; Ihrig et al., 2010), 
which maintains the virtue of simplicity but neglects the important micro foundation of 
staggered price setting mechanism. To preview our results, we find that there is a significant 
structural break in China’s inflation dynamics in 1994 after which an increase in globalization 
generates a significantly large increase in the response of inflation to the global demand and 
reduces the slope of inflation-domestic demand relation.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the baseline model and 
briefly describes its connection with the micro foundation of sticky prices; Section 3 
describes the data used in empirical work and some stylized facts about globalization and 
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inflation in China; Section 4 discusses the econometric issues related to the empirical 
estimations and provides empirical results of the underlying model, followed by relevant 
implications explored in Section 5; Section 6 concludes the paper.  
 
 
2. The model   
 
In this paper, we construct a dynamic, micro-founded inflation dynamics model for an 
open economy, like China, with sticky prices. Our model is a small but important extension 
of recent developments in the open economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) 
literature pioneered by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000), Clarida et al. (2002), Smets and Wouters 
(2002), and Gali and Monacelli (2005). The households’ consumption and savings decisions 
are in the spirit of Gali and Monacelli (2005) in which a representative household seeks to 
maximize a utility function with a composite consumption composed of both domestic goods 
and imported goods.  
For the domestic monopolistically competitive goods market, we lay out an extended 
framework of Calvo (1983), which can be easily rationalized in terms of sticky price setting 
of backward-looking firms in the closed-economy models. In particular, for the pricing 
behavior of the domestic firms, we assume an economic environment similar to the one in 
Calvo’s (1983) model, in which firms are able to revise their prices in any given period with a 
fixed probability (1  ). In addition, we assume both “forward-” and “backward-looking” 
firms co-exist in the economy with a proportion of   and (1  ), respectively. Further, we 
extend the rule of the recent pricing behavior of the backward-looking firms to incorporate a 
weighted process of past inflation, instead of stylized one lag of inflation inertia. 
Specifically, based on the regular assumptions in Calvo’s model and log-linear 
approximations, it is possible to obtain the (log) aggregate price level by 
1 (1 )
new
t t tp p p                                                           
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(1) 
where 
new
tp  is the new price set in period t. Let 
f
tp  be the price set by forward-looking 
firms and 
b
tp  be the price set by backward-looking firms at time t. The new price (relative to 
the aggregate price) can be expressed as a convex combination of 
f
tp  and 
b
tp , viz. 
( ) (1 )( )new f bt t t t t tp p p p p p       .                                        
(2) 
Next, following Woodford (2003), the pricing behavior of the forward-looking firms can be 
written as 
1
0 0
( ) (1 ) ( )f s st t t t s t t s
s s
p p E E mc    
 
  
 
    
                              
(3) 
where   denotes a subjective discount factor, t  denotes inflation rate, and mct is the real 
marginal cost of a typical domestic firm producing differentiated goods with a linear 
technology. Iterating (3) gives 
1 1 1(1 ) ( )
f f
t t t t t t t tp p E mc E p p         ＝ .                                
(4) 
Assume a rule of thumb in the pricing setting, viz. 
1 1
b new
t t t t tp p p p      .                                                     
(5) 
As emphasized in the literature, this is an elegant innovation in that the backward-looking 
firms can now set their prices to the average price determined in the most recent price 
adjustments with a correction for inflation. 
However, inflation inertia in (5) is confined to one single lag, which may neglect the 
importance of other historical inflation in predicting current inflation. In particular, if we 
interpret one period as being short, the backward-looking agents are likely to take more than 
one period to fully respond to changes in actual inflation (Zhang and Clovis, 2010). Therefore, 
  7 
it would appear reasonable to replace 1t   in (5) with a weighted average of inflation over 
several periods in the past. Importantly, this replacement can effectively mitigate a serial 
correlation problem in empirical analysis. As such, we extend (5) in the following process: 
1 1 1( ) ( )
b new
t t t t t tp p p p L                                                    
(6) 
where 
1
1 2( )
m
mL L L   
     is a polynomial in lag operator. In practice, m may be 
specified by utilizing appropriate diagnostic tests (e.g. standard information criteria).  
Combining (1)-(6), it can be shown that the dynamics of domestic inflation in terms of 
real marginal cost are described by an equation analogous to the one associated with a closed 
economy, viz. 
1
1 1
1
m
t e t t b t i t i t
i
E mc       

  

                                             
(7) 
where coefficients of (7) are functions of the deeper parameters in (1)-(6). 
It can be verified that, by combining equation (7) with the equations that depict the 
representative household seeking to maximize a utility function with a composite 
consumption composed of both domestic goods and imported goods, we can obtain an 
open-economy generalization of the extended New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) which 
incorporates an extended inflation dynamics and world excess demand, viz.  
1
1
*
1
1
ˆ ˆ
m
t e t t b t i t ti d f
i
t tc y yE        

  

                                     
(8) 
where ˆ ty  and 
*ˆ
ty  denote domestic and foreign real output gaps , t  is an error term, and 
other coefficients are functions of structural parameters in the DSGE system. 
Note that model (8) introduces the globalization factor and more inflation dynamics (i.e. 
1
1
m
i t i
i
 



 ) into an extended NKPC model and provides a channel through which 
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globalization may alter the dynamic response of inflation to domestic demand. If the impact 
of the world excess demand on inflation is trivial, the model then reduces to a closed 
economy version of NKPC. The inclusion of additional lag terms in the model is particularly 
important for obtaining valid results in empirical estimations since the stylized specification 
of the conventional NKPC model generally has serial correlation problem (Zhang et al., 
2008). The possible presence of serial correlation is crucial for the choice of valid 
instruments for GMM estimations of the NKPC models, since all lags of the dependent 
variable are invalid instruments in the presence of autoregressive serial correlation. Since lags 
of inflation are typically employed as instruments for estimation of the NKPC, the 
consistency of these estimates depends on the lack of such serial correlation. 
 
 
3. The data  
 
This section describes the data series used in the empirical work and provides some 
stylized facts pertaining to the underlying variables. In all, the baseline estimation of model 
(8) involves series for overall inflation πt; inflation expectations 1t tE  ; a measure of the 
domestic real output gap ˆty ; and a measure of the foreign real output gap 
*ˆ
ty . As will be 
explained in the next section, the estimation of model (8) also involves taking growth rate of 
monetary aggregate (i.e. M2) as an instrumental variable. A robustness analysis further 
involves effective exchange rates. Most of the data series were obtained from China 
Economic Information Center (CEIC) database, except for China’s nominal and real GDP 
series, which were obtained from Datastream. The raw level data for all quarterly series were 
seasonally adjusted prior to any further application. The final series used in empirical 
estimations are stationary (confirmed by conventional unit root tests). The sample size in our 
empirical estimations spans the first quarter of 1984 to the last quarter of 2012 (i.e. 
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1984Q1-2012Q4) dictated by availability of trade data.  
First, China’s overall inflation is measured by quarterly year-on-year growth rate of the 
GDP deflator. The raw data for GDP deflator is derived by dividing real GDP by nominal 
GDP. Figure 2 plots the time series of quarterly data for GDP deflator inflation. It shows that 
the dynamic evolution of overall inflation in China has witnessed remarkable cyclical 
behavior of booms and busts over time. In particular, Chinese inflation witnessed the first 
distinct increase in 1985, followed by a second peak in 1989, and the most striking peak in 
the middle 1990s. Since the late 1990s, however, inflation in China has been relatively low 
and stable, with a few periods of deflation. Despite several local peaks of inflation occurred 
in 2004, 2008, and 2011 due to transitory demand shock (e.g. shock to real estate market), 
supply shock (e.g. shock to food and energy prices), and policy shock (e.g. the 4-trillion 
stimulus package implemented in 2007-2008), respectively, the most recent decade can be 
characterized as a lower and less volatile inflation era than the 1980s-1990s. 
Second, inflation expectations are unobservable and have to be approximated via an 
appropriate method. A commonly used method in the literature (e.g. Gali and Gertler, 1999) 
is to approximate the unobserved inflation expectations in (8) by the corresponding realized 
future inflation, i.e. 1 1 1t t t tE e     , where 1te   denotes the rational prediction error. This 
approach however, induces an extra disturbance to the underlying model which is likely to 
affect the accuracy of the estimation of the variance of the error term associated with the 
NKPC model and complicate diagnostic tests (in particular serial correlation test) in the 
empirical estimations. To avoid these problems, we follow Pagan (1984) and approximate 
inflation expectations by projecting realized future inflation (i.e. 1t  ) on the instrumental 
variable (IV) set Z that is used in our empirical estimations (i.e. 1 1t t Z tE P    where 
1( )ZP Z Z Z Z
   is the projection matrix in terms of the IV set). It follows that this procedure 
will yield precisely the same coefficient estimates as those obtained by the IV estimation with 
the rational expectation approximation, while the standard errors will be different since the 
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former ignores uncertainty in the estimation of the projection matrix (Pagan, 1984). 
Third, the real domestic output gap in the baseline estimations was obtained from 
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter on the corresponding real GDP series (with the smoothing 
parameter 1600 for quarterly data). In robustness assessments, we also use growth rate of real 
GDP and deterministic, quadratically detrended log real GDP to approximate the real output 
gap in model (8).  
Fourth, the foreign output gap is calculated as a weighted sum of the real GDP gap 
measure of China’s top eighteen major trading partners4. The weight for each trade partner in 
each year is determined by the percentage of the partner’s trade (both exports and imports) 
with China over the total trade between China and the eighteen partners for that year.  
Table 1 presents the corresponding statistics for the trade weights of each country/region to 
China over 1984-2012. It shows that the trade weights of different countries/regions to China 
change over time. For example, the trade percentage of the U.S. to China witnessed a 
dramatic jump in the mid-1990s, rising from less than 12 percent before 1993 to above 16 
percent afterwards. Interestingly however, the trade percentage of Hong Kong to Mainland 
China has experienced a steady decline from the 1990s to the 2000s. A similar pattern of 
decline in trade percentage with China can also be observed for Japan, which was China’s 
largest trading partner during the 1980s and 1990s. Nevertheless, the U.S. took over Japan as 
China’s largest trading partner after 2004.    
The variations of the trade percentage are accommodated in the calculation of the foreign 
real GDP gap, i.e. 
18*
, ,1
ˆ ˆ
t j t j tj
y w y

 , where wj,t denotes the defined weight (i.e. trade 
percentage) at time t (quarterly observations within one year use the same weight of the year) 
and ,ˆ j ty  is the real output gap measure for country/region j.  
                                                        
4 China’s top eighteen major trading partners include Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Italy, 
Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Netherlands, Russia, Singapore, Thailand, Tai Wan, The United Kingdom, The United States and 
Latin America. Note that the trade data for Latin America aggregates the corresponding data of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. 
The trade data and real GDP series for the eighteen countries/regions were obtained from CEIC database.   
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Figure 2 plots the resulting foreign real output gap series in conjunction with China’s 
domestic real GDP gap and overall inflation series. Figure 2 shows that the cyclical behavior 
of domestic and foreign output gaps is similar in general, but differs in detail. In particular, 
the domestic GDP gap is more volatile than the foreign GDP gap before the late 1990s and 
vice versa during the most recent decade. This difference is reflected in the comparison of the 
dynamic evolution between inflation and the two output gaps: China’s overall inflation moves 
more closely with the domestic output gap than the foreign output gap before the late 1990s 
and the scenario reverses afterwards. Whether this difference envisions structural changes in 
inflation dynamics modeling, remains an empirical issue. 
 
 
Figure 2  China’s inflation, domestic real GDP gap, and foreign real GDP gap: 1984Q1—2012Q4 
Source: CEIC database and the author’s calculations.   
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Table 1 Trade percentage of China’s major trade partners (%) 
 AUS CAN FRA GEM HK IDO ITA JAP KOR MAL NETH RUS SIN THA TW UK US LAT 
1984 2.6 3.2 1.4 5.0 22.8 0.7 1.8 32.2 -- 1.0 1.2 3.1 3.3 1.0 -- 2.0 14.8 3.8 
1985 2.3 2.4 1.6 5.4 20.7 0.8 2.1 36.5 -- 0.7 1.0 3.4 4.0 0.7 -- 1.9 12.8 3.8 
1986 2.6 2.2 1.7 7.5 25.2 0.8 2.5 28.2 -- 0.6 1.2 4.3 2.9 0.7 -- 4.0 12.1 3.4 
1987 2.4 2.7 2.0 6.4 32.7 1.1 2.6 24.2 -- 0.8 1.2 3.7 2.9 1.0 -- 2.1 11.6 2.5 
1988 1.7 2.6 1.8 5.7 35.3 1.1 2.7 22.1 -- 1.0 1.3 3.8 2.9 1.3 -- 1.8 11.7 3.0 
1989 2.0 1.6 2.1 5.3 36.4 0.9 2.7 20.0 -- 1.1 1.3 4.2 3.4 1.3 -- 1.8 13.0 3.1 
1990 1.8 1.9 2.2 4.8 39.7 1.1 1.8 16.1 1.9 1.1 1.3 4.2 2.7 1.2 2.5 2.0 11.4 2.2 
1991 1.7 1.8 1.8 4.4 40.3 1.5 1.9 16.5 2.6 1.1 1.3 3.2 2.5 1.0 3.4 1.4 11.5 1.9 
1992 1.6 1.7 1.5 4.3 38.8 1.4 1.9 16.9 3.4 1.0 1.1 3.9 2.2 0.9 4.4 1.3 11.7 2.0 
1993 1.8 1.5 1.7 5.8 18.9 1.3 2.4 22.7 4.8 1.0 1.4 4.5 2.8 0.8 8.4 2.1 16.1 2.2 
1994 1.9 1.5 1.6 5.7 19.9 1.3 2.2 22.9 5.6 1.3 1.4 2.4 2.4 1.0 7.8 2.0 16.9 2.2 
1995 1.7 1.7 1.8 5.5 18.0 1.4 2.1 23.3 6.9 1.4 1.6 2.2 2.8 1.4 7.2 1.9 16.5 2.5 
1996 2.0 1.6 1.6 5.2 16.0 1.5 2.0 23.5 7.8 1.4 1.7 2.7 2.9 1.2 7.4 2.0 16.8 2.6 
1997 1.9 1.4 2.0 4.5 17.9 1.6 1.7 21.4 8.5 1.6 1.9 2.2 3.1 1.2 7.0 2.0 17.3 3.0 
1998 1.8 1.6 2.1 5.1 16.2 1.3 1.7 20.6 7.6 1.5 2.1 2.0 2.9 1.3 7.3 2.3 19.5 3.0 
1999 2.0 1.5 2.2 5.2 14.1 1.6 1.8 21.3 8.1 1.7 2.1 1.8 2.8 1.4 7.6 2.5 19.8 2.7 
2000 2.1 1.7 1.9 5.0 13.6 1.9 1.7 20.9 8.7 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.7 1.7 7.7 2.5 18.7 3.2 
2001 2.1 1.7 1.8 5.5 13.1 1.6 1.8 20.6 8.4 2.2 2.0 2.5 2.6 1.7 7.6 2.4 18.9 3.5 
2002 2.0 1.5 1.6 5.4 13.4 1.5 1.8 19.7 8.5 2.8 2.1 2.3 2.7 1.7 8.6 2.2 18.8 3.4 
2003 2.0 1.4 1.9 6.0 12.6 1.5 1.7 19.2 9.1 2.9 2.2 2.3 2.8 1.8 8.4 2.1 18.2 3.9 
2004 2.2 1.7 1.9 5.8 12.1 1.5 1.7 18.1 9.7 2.8 2.3 2.3 2.9 1.9 8.4 2.1 18.3 4.3 
2005 2.4 1.7 1.8 5.6 12.2 1.5 1.7 16.5 10.0 2.7 2.6 2.6 3.0 1.9 8.1 2.2 18.9 4.5 
2006 2.4 1.7 1.9 5.8 12.3 1.4 1.8 15.3 9.9 2.7 2.5 2.5 3.0 2.0 8.0 2.3 19.4 5.2 
2007 2.7 1.8 2.0 5.7 12.0 1.5 1.9 14.4 9.7 2.8 2.8 2.9 2.9 2.1 7.6 2.4 18.4 6.2 
2008 3.2 1.8 2.1 6.1 10.8 1.7 2.0 14.2 9.9 2.8 2.7 3.0 2.8 2.2 6.9 2.4 17.7 7.6 
2009 3.7 1.8 2.1 6.5 10.7 1.7 1.9 14.0 9.6 3.2 2.6 2.4 2.9 2.3 6.5 2.4 18.3 7.5 
2010 4.0 1.7 2.0 6.5 10.5 1.9 2.1 13.6 9.4 3.4 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.4 6.6 2.3 17.5 8.4 
2011 4.4 1.8 2.0 6.4 10.7 2.3 1.9 13.0 9.3 3.4 2.6 3.0 2.4 2.5 6.1 2.2 16.9 9.1 
2012 4.4 1.8 1.8 5.8 12.2 2.4 1.5 11.8 9.2 3.4 2.4 3.2 2.5 2.5 6.1 2.3 17.4 9.4 
Notes: The statistic is calculated as the ratio of China’s trade to each country (or region) as a percentage of total trade of China to all countries (regions) listed in the table (the data for Korea and Taiwan are not 
available until 1990); initial letters of each country/region’s name are used as an acronym to represent the country/region. 
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4. Empirical results 
 
4.1 Econometric issues 
As already noted in Section 1 of this paper, China’s economic globalization level has increased 
dramatically since the 1990s and this change may shift the mechanism of the impact of 
globalization on inflation dynamics in China. In particular, the empirical sample in our analysis 
covers a relatively long period from the early 1980s to 2012, which witnesses profound changes 
in China’s integration to the world economy and its macroeconomic dynamics. While the link 
between economic globalization and inflation dynamics makes it plausible that such changes 
may lead to structural breaks in the parameters of the NKPC model (8), any such effect and its 
timing depend on the behavior of economic agents. Since the dates of potential change points are 
therefore unknown, we perform break tests using the methodology proposed by Andrews (1993).  
  Prior to examining the structural break tests, several econometric issues in estimating the 
baseline model should be noted. First, inflation expectations in model (8) may be influenced by 
information relating to the current period. In addition, the real variables are also likely to be 
correlated with the contemporaneous noise, since demand shocks may influence both variables. 
Therefore, we use IV, or more specifically the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
estimator to estimate model (8) and pin down the endogeneity problem.  
  The baseline IV set used in estimating (8) consists of two lags of each of the domestic and 
foreign output gaps, and M2 growth rate, plus the lags of inflation included in the model (and a 
constant). Since the NKPC in (8) is specified with sufficient dynamics (by Akaike Information 
Criteria (AIC)) and is generally free of significant serial correlation in empirical estimations, 
lagged inflation values on the right-hand-side of (8) are used as valid instruments for themselves. 
In addition, the baseline estimations are verified through Godfrey’s (1994) IV serial correlation 
test, Hansen’s (1982) J-test for over-identifying restrictions, and the Stock and Yogo (2003)’s  
generalized F-test for weak IV.  
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Note that the Godfrey IV serial correlation test is implemented by adding appropriate lagged 
residuals from the initial estimation to the regressors from the initial model and checking their 
joint significance by the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) principle. This test is used to check the 
possibility of disturbance serial correlation in the IV estimations with null hypothesis of no serial 
correlation. Therefore, a large p-value indicates no significant serial correlation in the regression 
and vice versa. The Stock–Yogo weak instrument test provides diagnostic information on to 
what extent the underlying instruments are weak in the estimation. The statistics reported (in 
Table 3) are the Cragg-Donald statistics, with larger values indicating stronger IV sets. 
Based on the preceding design, we carry out formal unknown structural break tests. 
Specifically, we employ the Supreme Likelihood Ratio (LR) test of Andrews (1993) to test for 
unknown structural breaks in model (8). The test is designed to test for the null hypothesis of no 
structural break in the underlying parameters of interest. The corresponding p-values of the tests 
are computed using the method of Hansen (1997). By construction, the Andrews’ (1993) 
Supreme LR statistic is the maximum LR-statistic for testing a break through all possible break 
points over a specified searching range, say  , which is given by 
min max  sup ( ) [ , ]T i iSupLR LR                                   (9) 
where ( )T iLR   denotes sequential LR-statistic testing for the null hypothesis of no structural 
break in the underlying parameter. We set a searching interval [0.20,  0.80]i   of the full sample 
T to allow a minimum of 20 percent of effective observations contained in both pre- and 
post-break periods to avoid extreme statistic results.  
 
4.2 Baseline results 
Table 2 summarizes the results of the Andrews (1993) unknown structural break tests for the 
inflation dynamics model (8). Note that the optimal lag order in the model is jointly specified by 
AIC and Godfrey’s (1994) IV serial correlation test (with maximum eight lags). The break tests 
are performed on all the coefficients overall and then on the individual coefficients. Specifically, 
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the first row in Table 2 provides notational information for the coefficients in the break tests, 
with the first statistic (denoted all) testing for stability of all the coefficients in (8) while the 
other results referring to individual tests for the indicated coefficients. The second row reports 
p-values associated with the corresponding break test statistics for the null hypothesis of no 
structural change, while the third row labeled break date represents the estimated break date 
corresponding to the Sup-LR statistic. 
As can be seen from the results in Table 2, p-values for the break test statistics test overall 
model stability. The autoregressive coefficients (αi), and the coefficient on the foreign output gap 
(δf) are highly significant, with the break date statistics providing the uniform break point in the 
first quarter of 1994. These results suggest that the inflation dynamics model (8) for China 
indeed experiences a significant structural break early in 1994, and the strongest evidence of 
change relates to autoregressive coefficients and the foreign output gap.  
 
Table 2  Results of Andrews unknown breakpoint tests for model (8) 
 all  c γe γb αi δd δf 
p-Sup 0.001 0.696 0.206 0.499 0.000 0.558 0.001 
break date 1994Q1 1995Q1 1993Q3 1993Q3 1994Q1
 
2007Q1
 
1994Q1
 
Notes: The estimated equation is given by model (8) with sample spanning 1984Q1-2012Q4 prior to lag adjustment. Optimal 
autoregressive lag order in the NKPC is specified by AIC and IV serial correlation test (with maximum eight lags). The baseline 
IV set for the NKPC includes two lags of each of the domestic real GDP gap, the foreign real GDP gap, and M2 growth rate, plus 
the lags of inflation included in the model (and a constant). p-Sup denote p-values of the Sup-LR F-test for the null of stability; 
break date corresponds to the break point at which the maximum LR F-statistic is achieved; the structural break tests are 
implemented over central 60 percent of the underlying sample (to avoid possible extreme results).  
 
We have now obtained a structural break point based on which we can investigate the nature 
of changes in China’s inflation dynamics model and compare the impact of globalization on 
inflation dynamics over different sample periods when breaks in the coefficients are recognized 
at the beginning of 1994. Table 3 reports GMM estimates of model (8) over the whole sample 
and pre- and post-1994 periods for forward- and backward-looking inflation coefficients and the 
domestic and foreign output gap measures, in conjunction with relevant diagnostic statistics.  
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The diagnostic test statistics in Table 3 indicates that the specification of model (8) is free 
from significant serial correlation and the IV choice is valid and relatively strong in most cases. 
The p-values of the joint significance tests on the extra lagged inflation (from order two onwards) 
are very small in all regressions, indicating the statistically significant role of the extra lagged 
inflation in the empirical NKPC model. 
 
Table 3  (GMM) Estimation results of the inflation dynamics for China 
 Baseline estimates  Diagnostic tests 
Sample γe γb δd δf  p(αi) p-auto p-J weakIV 
A. 1984Q1-2012Q4 0.593
***
 0.415
***
 0.146
***
 0.078  0.000
***
 0.495 0.622 32.1
＊＊＊＊
 
 (0.108) (0.083) (0.040) (0.152)      
γe+γb=1 0.586
***
 0.414
***
 0.147 0.081  0.001
***
 0.542 0.775 32.1
＊＊＊＊
 
 (0.084) (0.084) (0.094) (0.174)      
B. 1984Q1-1994Q1 0.731
**
 0.471
***
 0.227 -0.300  0.000
***
 0.111 0.500 4.87
＊
 
 (0.128) (0.166) (0.151) (0.495)      
γe+γb=1 0.673
***
 0.327
***
 0.134 -0.089  0.000
***
 0.330 0.572 4.87
＊
 
 (0.118) (0.118) (0.156) (0.388)      
C. 1994Q2-2012Q4 0.529
***
 0.453
***
 0.080 0.164
***
  0.000
***
 0.318 0.230 6.78
＊＊
 
 (0.042) (0.033) (0.107) (0.056)      
γe+γb=1 0.545
***
 0.455
***
 0.091 0.144  0.000
***
 0.306 0.360 6.78
＊＊
 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.122) (0.104)      
Notes: Autoregressive lag order in the NKPC is specified by AIC and IV serial correlation test (with maximum of eight lags). 
Inflation expectations are measured by fitted values of regressing the realized future inflation on the baseline IV set (IV is the 
same as in Table 2). The Bartlett kernel with Newey-West (fixed bandwidth) HAC-robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. p(αi) is the p-value of joint significance test on lagged inflation beyond order one; p-auto, p-J, and weakIV refer to 
p-values of Godfrey’s (1994) first order IV serial correlation test, Hansen’s (1982) J-test, and Stock and Yogo’s (2003) weak 
instrumental variables test (Critical values for the weak IV test are provided in Stock and Yogo (2003), table I, with 
＊＊＊＊
, 
＊＊＊
,
＊
＊
, and 
＊
 denoting statistically significantly strong IV (5% significance level) when the desired maximal bias of the IV estimator 
relative to OLS is specified to be 5, 10, 20 and 30 percent respectively; the null hypothesis is that the underlying IV set is weak). 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percentiles respectively. All series involved in the estimations are 
stationary (confirmed by ADF unit root tests). 
 
More importantly, the baseline results reported in Panels A, B, and C in Table 3 reveal 
significant changes of the impact of the domestic and foreign output gap measures on China’s 
inflation over different sample periods. Specifically, Panel A shows that over the whole sample 
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period of 1984-2012 the domestic output gap drives inflation significantly with the coefficient 
estimate around 0.15. In contrast, the coefficient estimate on the foreign output gap is statically 
insignificant with the point estimate about a half of the domestic output gap. Although the 
significance of the coefficient on the domestic output gap is less striking when the convex 
restriction 1e b    is imposed, the magnitude of the point estimates on the real variables and 
their comparisons with each other resemble the scenario without the convex restriction. 
Panel B and Panel C provide evidence that the impact of the domestic and foreign output gaps 
on inflation has changed (switched) significantly. The coefficient estimate of the domestic output 
gap falls substantially from 0.23 pre-1994 to 0.08 post-1994. Conversely, the coefficient estimate 
of the foreign output gap has risen from an insignificant and negative value to a significant and 
positive value (0.16). These results indicate that foreign output gap plays a more important role 
than domestic output gap in the NKPC of China after 1994, with this effect statistically 
significant in the case of no convex restriction
5
.  
Although not the principal focus of our study, the results of Table 3 should be noted as they 
indicate the forward-looking behavior is in general predominant while the backward-looking 
component appears quantitatively less important in all sample periods, with this effect being 
more striking pre-1994. This finding may be unsurprising because inflation expectations in 
China during the 1980s and early 1990s were very high and played a predominant role in 
Chinese inflation behavior, presumably due to the ongoing economic reform and development, 
as well as an insufficient supply of consumer goods. 
To summarize, the coefficient estimates of the domestic and foreign output gap measures 
provide our main finding from Table 3, namely that the impact of the foreign output gap on 
China’s inflation has changed significantly its role from less important to more important 
compared with the domestic output gap. This finding indicates that inflation dynamics in China 
has shifted significantly since the mid-1990s and the impact of globalization via the foreign 
                                                        
5 It may be noted that the estimates of the standard errors are likely to be inflated when the convex restriction is imposed so that 
it is unsurprising for the significance of the corresponding statistics to be less striking. 
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excess demand has indeed risen accordingly.  
The next section assesses the robustness of this finding.  
 
4.3 Robustness assessments 
To assess the robustness of the baseline finding that the impact of globalization on inflation 
dynamics has risen after the mid-1990s in China, we carry out two sets of sensitivity exercises. 
First, we investigate whether the finding is robust to alternative output gap measures. That is, we 
estimate the model (8) by using growth rate of real GDP and deterministic, quadratically 
detrended log real GDP to approximate real output gap. Second, we augment the baseline model 
(8) by taking into account the possible impact of exchange rate on inflation, viz.    
1
1 1
1
q
d f
t e t t b t i t i d t f t s t t
i
c E y y eer          

  

                           (10) 
where eer  denotes growth rate of effective exchange rate and all other notations follow those 
in (8). By construction, model (10) considers explicitly possible pass-through of exchange rate 
on inflation. It may also mitigate a concern that the pass-through effect might be squeezed into 
the foreign output gap when exchange rate variable is omitted. 
Table 4 reports the corresponding results, which show that the baseline finding pertaining to 
the post-1994 period has no substantial change when alternative real variables are used. In 
addition, the estimation results pertaining to the augmented model (10) (the lower two panels in 
Table 4) with both real and nominal effective exchange rates provide a similar conclusion. In all 
regressions of the robustness analysis, the coefficient estimates on the foreign real economic 
activity outweigh the domestic counterparts, with the coefficient estimates on the foreign output 
variables ranging from 0.147 to 0.195 versus from 0.05 to 0.06 for the domestic output variables. 
Another interesting finding is that the pass-through effect of exchange rate on inflation is trivial 
and statistically insignificant. These results reinforce the conclusion that the foreign economic 
activity plays a quantitatively and statistically significant role in affecting China’s inflation over 
the post-1994 era.  
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Table 4  Robustness estimation results of the inflation dynamics model for China: 1994Q2-2012Q4 
 Baseline estimates  Diagnostic tests 
  γe γb δd δf δs  p(αi) p-auto p-J weakIV 
(1) y=qdgap 0.531
***
 0.433
***
 -0.012 0.147
*
    0.000
***
 0.107 0.217 8.97
＊＊＊
 
 (0.070) (0.042) (0.045) (0.087)       
(2) y=gdpgr 0.427
***
 0.517
***
 0.050 0.151
*
    0.004
***
 0.119 0.400 4.68
＊
 
 (0.140) (0.078) (0.132) (0.085)       
(3) add reergr 0.531
***
 0.450
***
 0.059 0.170
***
 0.002  0.002
***
 0.250 0.224 3.46 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.070) (0.027) (0.011)      
(4) add neergr 0.504
***
 0.469
***
 0.060 0.195
***
 -0.015  0.002
***
 0.369 0.203 2.85 
 (0.059) (0.040) (0.084) (0.016) (0.016)      
Notes: Sample spans 1994Q2 to 2012Q4 prior to lag adjustment (Andrews’ structural break tests were used to test for a structural 
break point for each regression and the results showed that 1994 is a significant break point in all regressions). qdgap denote 
quadratically detrended real GDP gap, while gdpgr, reergr, and neergr denote growth rates of real GDP, real and nominal 
effective exchange rates, respectively. The IV set for the last two regressions is augmented by adding two lags of exchange rate.  
 
 
5. Discussion   
 
The empirical results in Section 4 provide evidence of a significant structural break in the 
impact of globalization on China’s inflation dynamics in 1994. Omitting such a structural break, 
as the results pertaining to the whole sample estimation indicate, can blur and inadequately 
measure the role of global demand in domestic inflation dynamics. In addition, the world 
economic slack exerts less significant impact before 1994 than after on overall domestic inflation 
in China. These findings have several important implications. 
 
5.1 The structural break in 1994 
The structural break in 1994 coincides with the distinct increase in the level of globalization of 
China in the mid-1990s (recall Figure 1). This break time also reflects the important progress of 
China’s integration into the world economy enhanced by several financial and economic policy 
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regime shifts in China in the early 1990s. 
First, in the spring of 1992, a speech on the subject of “promoting Chinese economic 
development with all efforts” by the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping (known as the “South China 
Tour Speech”) marked a new round of fast economic development in China. To promote 
opening-up policy and encourage international trade and investment, China carried out a set of 
comprehensive economic reforms. In January 1994, the Chinese central government called off all 
subsidies to export and import firms with the intention to increase competition among those 
firms and generate reforming incentives for the firms doing business in foreign trade. In the 
meantime, Export-Import Bank of China (EIBC) was established with the main mandate to 
facilitate and promote international economic cooperation and trade. The establishment of the 
EIBC not only physically promoted Chinese foreign trade and investment with the world, but 
also philosophically sent a signal to the world that China would pursue an open economy model 
of economic development in the long-run.  
Second, China reformed its exchange rate system from the “dual” exchange rate regime (a 
market rate and an official rate that coexisted) to a unified single exchange rate system. Prior to 
1994, 80 percent of foreign exchange trading volume was at the market rate and 20 percent at the 
official rate (Yi, 2008). In 1994, however, China reformed the “dual” exchange rate resulting in a 
large depreciation of RMB Yuan against US dollar (USD) after 1994. The exchange rate of 
RMB/USD was below 6.0 before 1994 but it depreciated markedly to above 8.2 after 1994. This 
depreciation of RMB in 1994 increased Chinese export in the ensuing years. More importantly, 
the exchange rate regime shift effectively enhanced the stability of Chinese foreign trade policy 
and promoted reciprocal interaction of Chinese economy with the rest of the world.  
Another important change related to China’s economic globalization in the mid 1990s was 
Chinese banking reform, after which small business firms, especially foreign trade-related firms, 
could obtain more financial loans than before from financial intermediaries. Indeed, the banking 
reforms starting from 1994 entailed a progressive move toward less administrative and more 
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independent banking operations. In addition to the EIBC, another two policy banks were also 
established in 1994, namely China Development Bank and China Agricultural Development 
Bank, which took over policy lending from the big-four state-owned commercial banks. 
Meanwhile, a small but growing number of new banks were established and the restriction on 
foreign bank entries was relaxed in the mid-1990s in China. These reforms in banking industry 
provided more finance channels for foreign trade firms and increased the presence of Chinese 
multinationals, small businesses, traders, and migrants to the world.  
Other relevant changes in the mid-1990s include the enactment of Foreign Trade Law, the 
reduction of trade tariff, and the liberalization of RMB in current account (in 1996). All of these 
reforms and changes in the 1990s in China promoted greatly the integration of Chinese economy 
to the world economy. The underlying shifts also provide support and explanation for the 
structural break of year 1994 identified in our empirical work. The empirical results in the 
current study nonetheless, provide a scientific benchmark and an accurate break time for 
subsample analysis in the context of rising economic globalization and changing inflation 
dynamics in China.           
 
5.2 Policy implications 
The finding for the significant role of global demand in China’s domestic inflation dynamics 
since 1994 entails a further discussion on policy implications. First, Chinese monetary authority 
or central bank has been amused by the celebrated high-growth and low-inflation Eden in China 
since the late 1990s. In particular, the People’s Bank of China seems to be able to avoid being on 
the horns of one dilemma or another over the past decade and claims in most issues of their 
monetary policy report that it can control inflation without negative implications for economic 
growth and unemployment.  
Our finding in this paper suggests, however, that the Chinese central bank was not as effective 
as it may have claimed, and the high-growth and low-inflation Eden in China since the late 
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1990s is likely to be attributed to favorable global economic environment rather than to the 
sound and healthy policies of the central bank. This raises a realistic concern that the problems 
the Chinese central bank faced with are likely to be complicated by the rising economic 
globalization of Chinese economy, which will make the central bank’s job of controlling 
inflation more difficult than before.   
More specifically, because the Phillips curve is an indispensible component in monetary 
policy analysis, it is natural that the impact of globalization factor on inflation can also be 
transmitted to other macroeconomic variables in policy analysis frameworks. Suppose we 
analyze the issue in a standard three-equation model with an IS curve, a Phillips curve, and a 
policy reaction function. The impact of globalization on inflation will be transmitted to domestic 
real output through the IS curve and to monetary policy via the policy reaction function. 
Interestingly, however, Woodford (2007) carries out a formal theoretical analysis on the possible 
impact of globalization on this traditional monetary policy transmission process and his 
simulation results appear to suggest that increased globalization engenders no substantial 
reduction of the effects of domestic monetary policy on domestic economy. Through the 
theoretical designs, Woodford provides a comprehensive and valuable discussion on a wide 
range of ways that globalization might weaken the central bank’s ability to influence the 
economy.  
Our results in this paper are consistent with, rather than contrary to, Woodford’s (2007) 
analysis. As Woodford carefully interprets in his conclusion that his results mainly suggest that 
increased globalization should not eliminate the influence of domestic monetary policy over 
domestic inflation, but the degree of openness of an economy is no significance for the 
implementation of monetary policy. Indeed, increased international trade in financial assets, 
consumer goods and factors of production should lead to changes in the magnitudes of various 
key response elasticities relevant to the transmission mechanism for monetary policy (Woodford, 
2007). In particular, changes in the degree of goods market integration affect the quantitative 
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specification of both the aggregate-demand and aggregate-supply blocks in Woodford’s analysis. 
Consistent with the existing literature, our results do not mean that the rising globalization of 
China will eliminate the capacity of the central bank of China in stabilizing domestic inflation; 
neither do we regard the rising globalization as a fatal fear to the national economy. We argue 
that the central bank can gear up its capacity in controlling inflation by appropriate coordination 
with other central banks. Even without material-coordinated actions, the central bank can still 
increase the precision of its relevant forecasts and thereby improve the effects of its policies on 
domestic economy by taking into account global development as a part of its forecasting 
information set or augmenting its policy analysis framework with globalization factor.  
Our baseline finding, however, does call attention to the rising globalization that may generate 
material forces for central bankers to confront more practical issues than the traditional issues in 
a closed economy. The changing degree of globalization also makes the issue of change over 
time in the correct quantitative specification of the models used in a central bank a more pressing 
one to consider (Woodford, 2007). 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Over the past decades, China has markedly opened its economy and dramatically improved its 
connectedness with the world trade networks. In conjunction with the rising globalization, China 
has also witnessed marked change in the nature of inflation dynamics. Therefore, this paper has 
focused on the impact of rising globalization on inflation dynamics in the world largest 
developing economy. In particular, we have constructed an extended New Keynesian Phillips 
curve model from microeconomic foundations and showed that globalization factor (i.e. foreign 
output gap) can be incorporated in such a model. We proposed that this model for Chinese 
inflation might have experienced a structural break, given the fact that the level of globalization 
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of Chinese economy has changed substantively over the period from the early 1980s to 2012.  
  Our empirical investigations justified this conjecture and showed that there is a significant 
structural change in 1994 in China’s inflation dynamics model after which inflation in China 
responds significantly to the foreign excess demand while the slope of the inflation-domestic 
demand relation is reduced substantively. This finding indicates that the prescription that central 
banks should specifically react to developments in global economic performance is justified for 
China. The finding also indicates that the low and stable inflation period in China over the past 
decade may be attributed to the rising globalization of Chinese economy through which China 
benefited from the stable economic slack in its trading partners.  
While the higher level of globalization may help subdue and stabilize domestic inflation by, 
for example, stable global economic slack, during world tranquil time, negative global economic 
environment can also exert extra challenges for the domestic policy-makers. A notable case is 
the recent world financial crisis in 2007-2008, where China was affected by weaker demand 
from its trading partners. In addition, as recent experience of rising commodity prices suggests, 
globalization may sometimes be associated with rising import prices. And even when import 
prices were falling, the consequences for domestic inflation depended on how foreign real 
incomes changed and how domestic monetary policy reacted. Therefore, studies that neglect the 
role of foreign demand are likely to underestimate the impact of globalization on domestic 
inflation dynamics. 
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